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https://github.com/openwrt/packages.git
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ipmitool: update to 1.8.19
Remove all patches as they are upstreamed. Switch upstream as it moved. Need autoreconf now. Add PKG_INSTALL and PKG_BUILD_PARALLEL for consistency between pachages. Signed-off-by: Rosen Penev <rosenp@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
Rosen Penev
@@ -8,16 +8,23 @@
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include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
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PKG_NAME:=ipmitool
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PKG_VERSION:=1.8.18
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PKG_RELEASE:=5
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PKG_VERSION:=1.8.19
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PKG_RELEASE:=1
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PKG_SOURCE:=$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.bz2
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PKG_SOURCE_URL:=@SF/$(PKG_NAME)
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PKG_HASH:=0c1ba3b1555edefb7c32ae8cd6a3e04322056bc087918f07189eeedfc8b81e01
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PKG_SOURCE_PROTO:=git
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PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://codeberg.org/IPMITool/ipmitool
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PKG_SOURCE_VERSION:=IPMITOOL_$(subst .,_,$(PKG_VERSION))
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PKG_MIRROR_HASH:=a3f0d3510fc47cbfd752f58084a72a09d0d5b23113bd87bf78ee32e74adcb4bc
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PKG_MAINTAINER:=Alexander Couzens <lynxis@fe80.eu>
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PKG_LICENSE:=BSD-3-Clause
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PKG_LICENSE_FILES:=COPYING
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PKG_CPE_ID:=cpe:/a:ipmitool_project:ipmitool
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PKG_FIXUP=autoreconf
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PKG_INSTALL:=1
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PKG_BUILD_PARALLEL:=1
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include $(INCLUDE_DIR)/package.mk
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define Package/ipmitool
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@@ -26,7 +33,6 @@ define Package/ipmitool
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DEPENDS:=+libopenssl +libncurses +libreadline
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TITLE:=Command-line interface to IPMI-enabled devices
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URL:=https://github.com/ipmitool/ipmitool
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MAINTAINER:=Alexander Couzens <lynxis@fe80.eu>
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endef
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define Package/ipmitool/Default/description
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@@ -34,9 +40,10 @@ define Package/ipmitool/Default/description
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endef
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define Package/ipmitool/install
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$(INSTALL_DIR) $(1)/usr/bin/
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$(INSTALL_BIN) $(PKG_INSTALL_DIR)/usr/bin/ipmitool $(1)/usr/bin/
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$(INSTALL_DIR) $(1)/usr/sbin/
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$(INSTALL_BIN) $(PKG_BUILD_DIR)/src/ipmievd $(1)/usr/sbin/
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$(INSTALL_BIN) $(PKG_BUILD_DIR)/src/ipmitool $(1)/usr/sbin/
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$(INSTALL_BIN) $(PKG_INSTALL_DIR)/usr/sbin/ipmievd $(1)/usr/sbin/
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endef
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CONFIGURE_ARGS += \
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@@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
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From b57487e360916ab3eaa50aa6d021c73b6337a4a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Dennis Schridde <dennis.schridde@uni-heidelberg.de>
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Date: Wed, 30 Nov 2016 17:33:00 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH 1/4] ID:461 - OpenSSL 1.1 compatibility - "error: storage size
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of 'ctx' isn't known"
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In OpenSSL 1.1 EVP_CIPHER_CTX became opaque, cf. `man 3ssl EVP_EncryptInit`
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Fixes: ID:461
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---
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src/plugins/lanplus/lanplus_crypt_impl.c | 28 ++++++++++++++--------------
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1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
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--- a/src/plugins/lanplus/lanplus_crypt_impl.c
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+++ b/src/plugins/lanplus/lanplus_crypt_impl.c
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@@ -164,10 +164,10 @@ lanplus_encrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_
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uint8_t * output,
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uint32_t * bytes_written)
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{
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- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
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- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
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- EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key, iv);
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- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&ctx, 0);
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+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX* ctx;
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+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx);
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+ EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key, iv);
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+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0);
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*bytes_written = 0;
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@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ lanplus_encrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_
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assert((input_length % IPMI_CRYPT_AES_CBC_128_BLOCK_SIZE) == 0);
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- if(!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, output, (int *)bytes_written, input, input_length))
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+ if(!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, output, (int *)bytes_written, input, input_length))
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{
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/* Error */
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*bytes_written = 0;
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@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ lanplus_encrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_
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{
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uint32_t tmplen;
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- if(!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ctx, output + *bytes_written, (int *)&tmplen))
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+ if(!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, output + *bytes_written, (int *)&tmplen))
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{
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*bytes_written = 0;
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return; /* Error */
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@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ lanplus_encrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_
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{
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/* Success */
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*bytes_written += tmplen;
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- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
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+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
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}
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}
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}
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@@ -239,10 +239,10 @@ lanplus_decrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_
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uint8_t * output,
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uint32_t * bytes_written)
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{
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- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
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- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
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- EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key, iv);
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- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&ctx, 0);
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+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX* ctx;
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+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx);
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+ EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key, iv);
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+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0);
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if (verbose >= 5)
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@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ lanplus_decrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_
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assert((input_length % IPMI_CRYPT_AES_CBC_128_BLOCK_SIZE) == 0);
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- if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, output, (int *)bytes_written, input, input_length))
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+ if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, output, (int *)bytes_written, input, input_length))
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{
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/* Error */
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lprintf(LOG_DEBUG, "ERROR: decrypt update failed");
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@@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ lanplus_decrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_
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{
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uint32_t tmplen;
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- if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ctx, output + *bytes_written, (int *)&tmplen))
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+ if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, output + *bytes_written, (int *)&tmplen))
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{
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char buffer[1000];
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ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), buffer);
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@@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ lanplus_decrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_
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{
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/* Success */
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*bytes_written += tmplen;
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- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
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+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
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}
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}
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@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
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From 77fe5635037ebaf411cae46cf5045ca819b5c145 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Zdenek Styblik <stybla@turnovfree.net>
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Date: Sun, 15 Jan 2017 15:11:25 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH 2/4] ID:461 - Make compiler happier about changes related to
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OpenSSL 1.1
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Complaint was that ctx isn't initialized.
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---
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src/plugins/lanplus/lanplus_crypt_impl.c | 4 ++--
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1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
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--- a/src/plugins/lanplus/lanplus_crypt_impl.c
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+++ b/src/plugins/lanplus/lanplus_crypt_impl.c
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@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ lanplus_encrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_
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uint8_t * output,
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uint32_t * bytes_written)
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{
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- EVP_CIPHER_CTX* ctx;
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+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx);
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EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key, iv);
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0);
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@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ lanplus_decrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_
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uint8_t * output,
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uint32_t * bytes_written)
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{
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- EVP_CIPHER_CTX* ctx;
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+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx);
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EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key, iv);
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0);
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@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
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From f004b4b7197fc83e7d47ec8cbcaefffa9a922717 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Zdenek Styblik <stybla@turnovfree.net>
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Date: Sun, 12 Mar 2017 14:00:35 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH 3/4] ID:480 - ipmitool coredumps in EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init
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IPMI tool coredumps due to changes introduced in ID:461. This shouldn't be
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surprise as a NULL pointer is passed to init. Commit addresses this issue by
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calling EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new() instead of EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(), which is
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deprecated, and by checking return value of call to former function.
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---
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src/plugins/lanplus/lanplus_crypt_impl.c | 14 ++++++++++----
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1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
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--- a/src/plugins/lanplus/lanplus_crypt_impl.c
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+++ b/src/plugins/lanplus/lanplus_crypt_impl.c
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@@ -165,10 +165,13 @@ lanplus_encrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_
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uint32_t * bytes_written)
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{
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
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- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx);
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+ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
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+ if (ctx == NULL) {
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+ *bytes_written = 0;
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+ return;
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+ }
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EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key, iv);
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0);
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-
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*bytes_written = 0;
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@@ -240,11 +243,14 @@ lanplus_decrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_
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uint32_t * bytes_written)
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{
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
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- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx);
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+ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
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+ if (ctx == NULL) {
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+ *bytes_written = 0;
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+ return;
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+ }
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EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key, iv);
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0);
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-
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if (verbose >= 5)
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{
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printbuf(iv, 16, "decrypting with this IV");
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@@ -1,139 +0,0 @@
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From 1664902525a1c3771b4d8b3ccab7ea1ba6b2bdd1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Holger Liebig <holger.liebig@ts.fujitsu.com>
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Date: Tue, 4 Apr 2017 20:43:05 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH 4/4] ID:480 - Call EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free() instead of
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup()
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Call EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free() instead of EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup() to fix memory
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leak.
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---
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src/plugins/lanplus/lanplus_crypt_impl.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++---------------
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1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
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--- a/src/plugins/lanplus/lanplus_crypt_impl.c
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+++ b/src/plugins/lanplus/lanplus_crypt_impl.c
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@@ -165,13 +165,6 @@ lanplus_encrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_
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uint32_t * bytes_written)
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{
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
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- ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
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- if (ctx == NULL) {
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- *bytes_written = 0;
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- return;
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- }
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- EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key, iv);
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- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0);
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*bytes_written = 0;
|
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@@ -185,6 +178,14 @@ lanplus_encrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_
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printbuf(input, input_length, "encrypting this data");
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}
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+ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
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+ if (ctx == NULL) {
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+ lprintf(LOG_DEBUG, "ERROR: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new() failed");
|
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+ return;
|
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+ }
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+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx);
|
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+ EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key, iv);
|
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+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0);
|
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|
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/*
|
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* The default implementation adds a whole block of padding if the input
|
||||
@@ -198,7 +199,6 @@ lanplus_encrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* Error */
|
||||
*bytes_written = 0;
|
||||
- return;
|
||||
}
|
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else
|
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{
|
||||
@@ -206,16 +206,17 @@ lanplus_encrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_
|
||||
|
||||
if(!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, output + *bytes_written, (int *)&tmplen))
|
||||
{
|
||||
+ /* Error */
|
||||
*bytes_written = 0;
|
||||
- return; /* Error */
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* Success */
|
||||
*bytes_written += tmplen;
|
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- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
|
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}
|
||||
}
|
||||
+ /* performs cleanup and free */
|
||||
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -243,13 +244,6 @@ lanplus_decrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_
|
||||
uint32_t * bytes_written)
|
||||
{
|
||||
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
|
||||
- ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
|
||||
- if (ctx == NULL) {
|
||||
- *bytes_written = 0;
|
||||
- return;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
- EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key, iv);
|
||||
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0);
|
||||
|
||||
if (verbose >= 5)
|
||||
{
|
||||
@@ -258,12 +252,20 @@ lanplus_decrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_
|
||||
printbuf(input, input_length, "decrypting this data");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
-
|
||||
*bytes_written = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if (input_length == 0)
|
||||
return;
|
||||
|
||||
+ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
|
||||
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
|
||||
+ lprintf(LOG_DEBUG, "ERROR: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new() failed");
|
||||
+ return;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx);
|
||||
+ EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key, iv);
|
||||
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0);
|
||||
+
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* The default implementation adds a whole block of padding if the input
|
||||
* data is perfectly aligned. We would like to keep that from happening.
|
||||
@@ -277,7 +279,6 @@ lanplus_decrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_
|
||||
/* Error */
|
||||
lprintf(LOG_DEBUG, "ERROR: decrypt update failed");
|
||||
*bytes_written = 0;
|
||||
- return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
@@ -285,20 +286,21 @@ lanplus_decrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_
|
||||
|
||||
if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, output + *bytes_written, (int *)&tmplen))
|
||||
{
|
||||
+ /* Error */
|
||||
char buffer[1000];
|
||||
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), buffer);
|
||||
lprintf(LOG_DEBUG, "the ERR error %s", buffer);
|
||||
lprintf(LOG_DEBUG, "ERROR: decrypt final failed");
|
||||
*bytes_written = 0;
|
||||
- return; /* Error */
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* Success */
|
||||
*bytes_written += tmplen;
|
||||
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
+ /* performs cleanup and free */
|
||||
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
|
||||
|
||||
if (verbose >= 5)
|
||||
{
|
||||
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From cf39da53236abf02d39c6a98a645488933f3e861 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Rosen Penev <rosenp@gmail.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 21 Aug 2018 19:29:07 -0700
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] ipmitool: Fix compile with deprecated APIs disabled.
|
||||
|
||||
From the man page:
|
||||
|
||||
EVP_CIPHER_CTX was made opaque in OpenSSL 1.1.0. As a result,
|
||||
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset() appeared and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup() disappeared.
|
||||
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init() remains as an alias for EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset().
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Rosen Penev <rosenp@gmail.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
src/plugins/lanplus/lanplus_crypt_impl.c | 8 ++++++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
--- a/src/plugins/lanplus/lanplus_crypt_impl.c
|
||||
+++ b/src/plugins/lanplus/lanplus_crypt_impl.c
|
||||
@@ -183,7 +183,11 @@ lanplus_encrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_
|
||||
lprintf(LOG_DEBUG, "ERROR: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new() failed");
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
|
||||
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx);
|
||||
+#else
|
||||
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(ctx);
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key, iv);
|
||||
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -262,7 +266,11 @@ lanplus_decrypt_aes_cbc_128(const uint8_
|
||||
lprintf(LOG_DEBUG, "ERROR: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new() failed");
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
|
||||
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx);
|
||||
+#else
|
||||
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(ctx);
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key, iv);
|
||||
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,123 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 960dbb956d9f9cb05b719087faed53c88dc80956 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Chrostoper Ertl <chertl@microsoft.com>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2019 16:33:59 +0000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 06/11] fru: Fix buffer overflow vulnerabilities
|
||||
|
||||
Partial fix for CVE-2020-5208, see
|
||||
https://github.com/ipmitool/ipmitool/security/advisories/GHSA-g659-9qxw-p7cp
|
||||
|
||||
The `read_fru_area_section` function only performs size validation of
|
||||
requested read size, and falsely assumes that the IPMI message will not
|
||||
respond with more than the requested amount of data; it uses the
|
||||
unvalidated response size to copy into `frubuf`. If the response is
|
||||
larger than the request, this can result in overflowing the buffer.
|
||||
|
||||
The same issue affects the `read_fru_area` function.
|
||||
---
|
||||
lib/ipmi_fru.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
|
||||
1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
--- a/lib/ipmi_fru.c
|
||||
+++ b/lib/ipmi_fru.c
|
||||
@@ -615,7 +615,10 @@ int
|
||||
read_fru_area(struct ipmi_intf * intf, struct fru_info *fru, uint8_t id,
|
||||
uint32_t offset, uint32_t length, uint8_t *frubuf)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- uint32_t off = offset, tmp, finish;
|
||||
+ uint32_t off = offset;
|
||||
+ uint32_t tmp;
|
||||
+ uint32_t finish;
|
||||
+ uint32_t size_left_in_buffer;
|
||||
struct ipmi_rs * rsp;
|
||||
struct ipmi_rq req;
|
||||
uint8_t msg_data[4];
|
||||
@@ -628,10 +631,12 @@ read_fru_area(struct ipmi_intf * intf, s
|
||||
|
||||
finish = offset + length;
|
||||
if (finish > fru->size) {
|
||||
+ memset(frubuf + fru->size, 0, length - fru->size);
|
||||
finish = fru->size;
|
||||
lprintf(LOG_NOTICE, "Read FRU Area length %d too large, "
|
||||
"Adjusting to %d",
|
||||
offset + length, finish - offset);
|
||||
+ length = finish - offset;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
|
||||
@@ -667,6 +672,7 @@ read_fru_area(struct ipmi_intf * intf, s
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ size_left_in_buffer = length;
|
||||
do {
|
||||
tmp = fru->access ? off >> 1 : off;
|
||||
msg_data[0] = id;
|
||||
@@ -707,9 +713,18 @@ read_fru_area(struct ipmi_intf * intf, s
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
tmp = fru->access ? rsp->data[0] << 1 : rsp->data[0];
|
||||
+ if(rsp->data_len < 1
|
||||
+ || tmp > rsp->data_len - 1
|
||||
+ || tmp > size_left_in_buffer)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ printf(" Not enough buffer size");
|
||||
+ return -1;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
memcpy(frubuf, rsp->data + 1, tmp);
|
||||
off += tmp;
|
||||
frubuf += tmp;
|
||||
+ size_left_in_buffer -= tmp;
|
||||
/* sometimes the size returned in the Info command
|
||||
* is too large. return 0 so higher level function
|
||||
* still attempts to parse what was returned */
|
||||
@@ -742,7 +757,9 @@ read_fru_area_section(struct ipmi_intf *
|
||||
uint32_t offset, uint32_t length, uint8_t *frubuf)
|
||||
{
|
||||
static uint32_t fru_data_rqst_size = 20;
|
||||
- uint32_t off = offset, tmp, finish;
|
||||
+ uint32_t off = offset;
|
||||
+ uint32_t tmp, finish;
|
||||
+ uint32_t size_left_in_buffer;
|
||||
struct ipmi_rs * rsp;
|
||||
struct ipmi_rq req;
|
||||
uint8_t msg_data[4];
|
||||
@@ -755,10 +772,12 @@ read_fru_area_section(struct ipmi_intf *
|
||||
|
||||
finish = offset + length;
|
||||
if (finish > fru->size) {
|
||||
+ memset(frubuf + fru->size, 0, length - fru->size);
|
||||
finish = fru->size;
|
||||
lprintf(LOG_NOTICE, "Read FRU Area length %d too large, "
|
||||
"Adjusting to %d",
|
||||
offset + length, finish - offset);
|
||||
+ length = finish - offset;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
|
||||
@@ -773,6 +792,8 @@ read_fru_area_section(struct ipmi_intf *
|
||||
if (fru->access && fru_data_rqst_size > 16)
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
fru_data_rqst_size = 16;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ size_left_in_buffer = length;
|
||||
do {
|
||||
tmp = fru->access ? off >> 1 : off;
|
||||
msg_data[0] = id;
|
||||
@@ -804,8 +825,16 @@ read_fru_area_section(struct ipmi_intf *
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
tmp = fru->access ? rsp->data[0] << 1 : rsp->data[0];
|
||||
+ if(rsp->data_len < 1
|
||||
+ || tmp > rsp->data_len - 1
|
||||
+ || tmp > size_left_in_buffer)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ printf(" Not enough buffer size");
|
||||
+ return -1;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
memcpy((frubuf + off)-offset, rsp->data + 1, tmp);
|
||||
off += tmp;
|
||||
+ size_left_in_buffer -= tmp;
|
||||
|
||||
/* sometimes the size returned in the Info command
|
||||
* is too large. return 0 so higher level function
|
||||
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 910e5782b7d9f222d4e34d3505d0d636ff757103 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Chrostoper Ertl <chertl@microsoft.com>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2019 16:44:18 +0000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 07/11] fru: Fix buffer overflow in ipmi_spd_print_fru
|
||||
|
||||
Partial fix for CVE-2020-5208, see
|
||||
https://github.com/ipmitool/ipmitool/security/advisories/GHSA-g659-9qxw-p7cp
|
||||
|
||||
The `ipmi_spd_print_fru` function has a similar issue as the one fixed
|
||||
by the previous commit in `read_fru_area_section`. An initial request is
|
||||
made to get the `fru.size`, which is used as the size for the allocation
|
||||
of `spd_data`. Inside a loop, further requests are performed to get the
|
||||
copy sizes which are not checked before being used as the size for a
|
||||
copy into the buffer.
|
||||
---
|
||||
lib/dimm_spd.c | 9 ++++++++-
|
||||
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
--- a/lib/dimm_spd.c
|
||||
+++ b/lib/dimm_spd.c
|
||||
@@ -1621,7 +1621,7 @@ ipmi_spd_print_fru(struct ipmi_intf * in
|
||||
struct ipmi_rq req;
|
||||
struct fru_info fru;
|
||||
uint8_t *spd_data, msg_data[4];
|
||||
- int len, offset;
|
||||
+ uint32_t len, offset;
|
||||
|
||||
msg_data[0] = id;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1697,6 +1697,13 @@ ipmi_spd_print_fru(struct ipmi_intf * in
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
len = rsp->data[0];
|
||||
+ if(rsp->data_len < 1
|
||||
+ || len > rsp->data_len - 1
|
||||
+ || len > fru.size - offset)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ printf(" Not enough buffer size");
|
||||
+ return -1;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
memcpy(&spd_data[offset], rsp->data + 1, len);
|
||||
offset += len;
|
||||
} while (offset < fru.size);
|
||||
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 4f7778ed232a92bde388f38917b94f458a82c78e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Chrostoper Ertl <chertl@microsoft.com>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2019 16:51:49 +0000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 08/11] session: Fix buffer overflow in ipmi_get_session_info
|
||||
|
||||
Partial fix for CVE-2020-5208, see
|
||||
https://github.com/ipmitool/ipmitool/security/advisories/GHSA-g659-9qxw-p7cp
|
||||
|
||||
The `ipmi_get_session_info` function does not properly check the
|
||||
response `data_len`, which is used as a copy size, allowing stack buffer
|
||||
overflow.
|
||||
---
|
||||
lib/ipmi_session.c | 12 ++++++++----
|
||||
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
--- a/lib/ipmi_session.c
|
||||
+++ b/lib/ipmi_session.c
|
||||
@@ -309,8 +309,10 @@ ipmi_get_session_info(struct ipmi_intf
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
- memcpy(&session_info, rsp->data, rsp->data_len);
|
||||
- print_session_info(&session_info, rsp->data_len);
|
||||
+ memcpy(&session_info, rsp->data,
|
||||
+ __min(rsp->data_len, sizeof(session_info)));
|
||||
+ print_session_info(&session_info,
|
||||
+ __min(rsp->data_len, sizeof(session_info)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -341,8 +343,10 @@ ipmi_get_session_info(struct ipmi_intf
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- memcpy(&session_info, rsp->data, rsp->data_len);
|
||||
- print_session_info(&session_info, rsp->data_len);
|
||||
+ memcpy(&session_info, rsp->data,
|
||||
+ __min(rsp->data_len, sizeof(session_info)));
|
||||
+ print_session_info(&session_info,
|
||||
+ __min(rsp->data_len, sizeof(session_info)));
|
||||
|
||||
} while (i <= session_info.session_slot_count);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 743dd4faa302f22950e4438cf684e1e398eb47eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Chrostoper Ertl <chertl@microsoft.com>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2019 16:56:38 +0000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 09/11] channel: Fix buffer overflow
|
||||
MIME-Version: 1.0
|
||||
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
|
||||
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
|
||||
|
||||
Partial fix for CVE-2020-5208, see
|
||||
https://github.com/ipmitool/ipmitool/security/advisories/GHSA-g659-9qxw-p7cp
|
||||
|
||||
The `ipmi_get_channel_cipher_suites` function does not properly check
|
||||
the final response’s `data_len`, which can lead to stack buffer overflow
|
||||
on the final copy.
|
||||
---
|
||||
lib/ipmi_channel.c | 5 ++++-
|
||||
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
--- a/lib/ipmi_channel.c
|
||||
+++ b/lib/ipmi_channel.c
|
||||
@@ -413,7 +413,10 @@ ipmi_get_channel_cipher_suites(struct ip
|
||||
lprintf(LOG_ERR, "Unable to Get Channel Cipher Suites");
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
- if (rsp->ccode > 0) {
|
||||
+ if (rsp->ccode
|
||||
+ || rsp->data_len < 1
|
||||
+ || rsp->data_len > sizeof(uint8_t) + 0x10)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
lprintf(LOG_ERR, "Get Channel Cipher Suites failed: %s",
|
||||
val2str(rsp->ccode, completion_code_vals));
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
@@ -1,83 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From e048e9c65a52f0879d482531e70735c1d314d43a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Chrostoper Ertl <chertl@microsoft.com>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2019 17:06:39 +0000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 10/11] lanp: Fix buffer overflows in get_lan_param_select
|
||||
MIME-Version: 1.0
|
||||
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
|
||||
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
|
||||
|
||||
Partial fix for CVE-2020-5208, see
|
||||
https://github.com/ipmitool/ipmitool/security/advisories/GHSA-g659-9qxw-p7cp
|
||||
|
||||
The `get_lan_param_select` function is missing a validation check on the
|
||||
response’s `data_len`, which it then returns to caller functions, where
|
||||
stack buffer overflow can occur.
|
||||
---
|
||||
lib/ipmi_lanp.c | 14 +++++++-------
|
||||
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
--- a/lib/ipmi_lanp.c
|
||||
+++ b/lib/ipmi_lanp.c
|
||||
@@ -1809,7 +1809,7 @@ ipmi_lan_alert_set(struct ipmi_intf * in
|
||||
if (p == NULL) {
|
||||
return (-1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
- memcpy(data, p->data, p->data_len);
|
||||
+ memcpy(data, p->data, __min(p->data_len, sizeof(data)));
|
||||
/* set new ipaddr */
|
||||
memcpy(data+3, temp, 4);
|
||||
printf("Setting LAN Alert %d IP Address to %d.%d.%d.%d\n", alert,
|
||||
@@ -1824,7 +1824,7 @@ ipmi_lan_alert_set(struct ipmi_intf * in
|
||||
if (p == NULL) {
|
||||
return (-1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
- memcpy(data, p->data, p->data_len);
|
||||
+ memcpy(data, p->data, __min(p->data_len, sizeof(data)));
|
||||
/* set new macaddr */
|
||||
memcpy(data+7, temp, 6);
|
||||
printf("Setting LAN Alert %d MAC Address to "
|
||||
@@ -1838,7 +1838,7 @@ ipmi_lan_alert_set(struct ipmi_intf * in
|
||||
if (p == NULL) {
|
||||
return (-1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
- memcpy(data, p->data, p->data_len);
|
||||
+ memcpy(data, p->data, __min(p->data_len, sizeof(data)));
|
||||
|
||||
if (strncasecmp(argv[1], "def", 3) == 0 ||
|
||||
strncasecmp(argv[1], "default", 7) == 0) {
|
||||
@@ -1864,7 +1864,7 @@ ipmi_lan_alert_set(struct ipmi_intf * in
|
||||
if (p == NULL) {
|
||||
return (-1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
- memcpy(data, p->data, p->data_len);
|
||||
+ memcpy(data, p->data, __min(p->data_len, sizeof(data)));
|
||||
|
||||
if (strncasecmp(argv[1], "on", 2) == 0 ||
|
||||
strncasecmp(argv[1], "yes", 3) == 0) {
|
||||
@@ -1889,7 +1889,7 @@ ipmi_lan_alert_set(struct ipmi_intf * in
|
||||
if (p == NULL) {
|
||||
return (-1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
- memcpy(data, p->data, p->data_len);
|
||||
+ memcpy(data, p->data, __min(p->data_len, sizeof(data)));
|
||||
|
||||
if (strncasecmp(argv[1], "pet", 3) == 0) {
|
||||
printf("Setting LAN Alert %d destination to PET Trap\n", alert);
|
||||
@@ -1917,7 +1917,7 @@ ipmi_lan_alert_set(struct ipmi_intf * in
|
||||
if (p == NULL) {
|
||||
return (-1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
- memcpy(data, p->data, p->data_len);
|
||||
+ memcpy(data, p->data, __min(p->data_len, sizeof(data)));
|
||||
|
||||
if (str2uchar(argv[1], &data[2]) != 0) {
|
||||
lprintf(LOG_ERR, "Invalid time: %s", argv[1]);
|
||||
@@ -1933,7 +1933,7 @@ ipmi_lan_alert_set(struct ipmi_intf * in
|
||||
if (p == NULL) {
|
||||
return (-1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
- memcpy(data, p->data, p->data_len);
|
||||
+ memcpy(data, p->data, __min(p->data_len, sizeof(data)));
|
||||
|
||||
if (str2uchar(argv[1], &data[3]) != 0) {
|
||||
lprintf(LOG_ERR, "Invalid retry: %s", argv[1]);
|
||||
@@ -1,130 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 98b47424cf548f58c4d295fa8235210406ea85ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Chrostoper Ertl <chertl@microsoft.com>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2019 17:13:45 +0000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 11/11] fru, sdr: Fix id_string buffer overflows
|
||||
|
||||
Final part of the fixes for CVE-2020-5208, see
|
||||
https://github.com/ipmitool/ipmitool/security/advisories/GHSA-g659-9qxw-p7cp
|
||||
|
||||
9 variants of stack buffer overflow when parsing `id_string` field of
|
||||
SDR records returned from `CMD_GET_SDR` command.
|
||||
|
||||
SDR record structs have an `id_code` field, and an `id_string` `char`
|
||||
array.
|
||||
|
||||
The length of `id_string` is calculated as `(id_code & 0x1f) + 1`,
|
||||
which can be larger than expected 16 characters (if `id_code = 0xff`,
|
||||
then length will be `(0xff & 0x1f) + 1 = 32`).
|
||||
|
||||
In numerous places, this can cause stack buffer overflow when copying
|
||||
into fixed buffer of size `17` bytes from this calculated length.
|
||||
---
|
||||
lib/ipmi_fru.c | 2 +-
|
||||
lib/ipmi_sdr.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
|
||||
2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
--- a/lib/ipmi_fru.c
|
||||
+++ b/lib/ipmi_fru.c
|
||||
@@ -3062,7 +3062,7 @@ ipmi_fru_print(struct ipmi_intf * intf,
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
memset(desc, 0, sizeof(desc));
|
||||
- memcpy(desc, fru->id_string, fru->id_code & 0x01f);
|
||||
+ memcpy(desc, fru->id_string, __min(fru->id_code & 0x01f, sizeof(desc)));
|
||||
desc[fru->id_code & 0x01f] = 0;
|
||||
printf("FRU Device Description : %s (ID %d)\n", desc, fru->device_id);
|
||||
|
||||
--- a/lib/ipmi_sdr.c
|
||||
+++ b/lib/ipmi_sdr.c
|
||||
@@ -2084,7 +2084,7 @@ ipmi_sdr_print_sensor_eventonly(struct i
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
|
||||
memset(desc, 0, sizeof (desc));
|
||||
- snprintf(desc, (sensor->id_code & 0x1f) + 1, "%s", sensor->id_string);
|
||||
+ snprintf(desc, sizeof(desc), "%.*s", (sensor->id_code & 0x1f) + 1, sensor->id_string);
|
||||
|
||||
if (verbose) {
|
||||
printf("Sensor ID : %s (0x%x)\n",
|
||||
@@ -2135,7 +2135,7 @@ ipmi_sdr_print_sensor_mc_locator(struct
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
|
||||
memset(desc, 0, sizeof (desc));
|
||||
- snprintf(desc, (mc->id_code & 0x1f) + 1, "%s", mc->id_string);
|
||||
+ snprintf(desc, sizeof(desc), "%.*s", (mc->id_code & 0x1f) + 1, mc->id_string);
|
||||
|
||||
if (verbose == 0) {
|
||||
if (csv_output)
|
||||
@@ -2228,7 +2228,7 @@ ipmi_sdr_print_sensor_generic_locator(st
|
||||
char desc[17];
|
||||
|
||||
memset(desc, 0, sizeof (desc));
|
||||
- snprintf(desc, (dev->id_code & 0x1f) + 1, "%s", dev->id_string);
|
||||
+ snprintf(desc, sizeof(desc), "%.*s", (dev->id_code & 0x1f) + 1, dev->id_string);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!verbose) {
|
||||
if (csv_output)
|
||||
@@ -2285,7 +2285,7 @@ ipmi_sdr_print_sensor_fru_locator(struct
|
||||
char desc[17];
|
||||
|
||||
memset(desc, 0, sizeof (desc));
|
||||
- snprintf(desc, (fru->id_code & 0x1f) + 1, "%s", fru->id_string);
|
||||
+ snprintf(desc, sizeof(desc), "%.*s", (fru->id_code & 0x1f) + 1, fru->id_string);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!verbose) {
|
||||
if (csv_output)
|
||||
@@ -2489,35 +2489,43 @@ ipmi_sdr_print_name_from_rawentry(struct
|
||||
|
||||
int rc =0;
|
||||
char desc[17];
|
||||
+ const char *id_string;
|
||||
+ uint8_t id_code;
|
||||
memset(desc, ' ', sizeof (desc));
|
||||
|
||||
switch ( type) {
|
||||
case SDR_RECORD_TYPE_FULL_SENSOR:
|
||||
record.full = (struct sdr_record_full_sensor *) raw;
|
||||
- snprintf(desc, (record.full->id_code & 0x1f) +1, "%s",
|
||||
- (const char *)record.full->id_string);
|
||||
+ id_code = record.full->id_code;
|
||||
+ id_string = record.full->id_string;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
+
|
||||
case SDR_RECORD_TYPE_COMPACT_SENSOR:
|
||||
record.compact = (struct sdr_record_compact_sensor *) raw ;
|
||||
- snprintf(desc, (record.compact->id_code & 0x1f) +1, "%s",
|
||||
- (const char *)record.compact->id_string);
|
||||
+ id_code = record.compact->id_code;
|
||||
+ id_string = record.compact->id_string;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
+
|
||||
case SDR_RECORD_TYPE_EVENTONLY_SENSOR:
|
||||
record.eventonly = (struct sdr_record_eventonly_sensor *) raw ;
|
||||
- snprintf(desc, (record.eventonly->id_code & 0x1f) +1, "%s",
|
||||
- (const char *)record.eventonly->id_string);
|
||||
- break;
|
||||
+ id_code = record.eventonly->id_code;
|
||||
+ id_string = record.eventonly->id_string;
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+
|
||||
case SDR_RECORD_TYPE_MC_DEVICE_LOCATOR:
|
||||
record.mcloc = (struct sdr_record_mc_locator *) raw ;
|
||||
- snprintf(desc, (record.mcloc->id_code & 0x1f) +1, "%s",
|
||||
- (const char *)record.mcloc->id_string);
|
||||
+ id_code = record.mcloc->id_code;
|
||||
+ id_string = record.mcloc->id_string;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
+
|
||||
default:
|
||||
rc = -1;
|
||||
- break;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ if (!rc) {
|
||||
+ snprintf(desc, sizeof(desc), "%.*s", (id_code & 0x1f) + 1, id_string);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
|
||||
- lprintf(LOG_INFO, "ID: 0x%04x , NAME: %-16s", id, desc);
|
||||
+ lprintf(LOG_INFO, "ID: 0x%04x , NAME: %-16s", id, desc);
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From c3939dac2c060651361fc71516806f9ab8c38901 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Vaclav Dolezal <vdolezal@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2020 11:26:32 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] hpmfwupg: move variable definition to .c file
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Vaclav Dolezal <vdolezal@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
include/ipmitool/ipmi_hpmfwupg.h | 2 +-
|
||||
lib/ipmi_hpmfwupg.c | 2 ++
|
||||
2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
--- a/include/ipmitool/ipmi_hpmfwupg.h
|
||||
+++ b/include/ipmitool/ipmi_hpmfwupg.h
|
||||
@@ -800,7 +800,7 @@ typedef struct _VERSIONINFO {
|
||||
char descString[HPMFWUPG_DESC_STRING_LENGTH + 1];
|
||||
}VERSIONINFO, *PVERSIONINFO;
|
||||
|
||||
-VERSIONINFO gVersionInfo[HPMFWUPG_COMPONENT_ID_MAX];
|
||||
+extern VERSIONINFO gVersionInfo[HPMFWUPG_COMPONENT_ID_MAX];
|
||||
|
||||
#define TARGET_VER (0x01)
|
||||
#define ROLLBACK_VER (0x02)
|
||||
--- a/lib/ipmi_hpmfwupg.c
|
||||
+++ b/lib/ipmi_hpmfwupg.c
|
||||
@@ -58,6 +58,8 @@ ipmi_intf_get_max_request_data_size(stru
|
||||
|
||||
extern int verbose;
|
||||
|
||||
+VERSIONINFO gVersionInfo[HPMFWUPG_COMPONENT_ID_MAX];
|
||||
+
|
||||
int HpmfwupgUpgrade(struct ipmi_intf *intf, char *imageFilename,
|
||||
int activate, int, int);
|
||||
int HpmfwupgValidateImageIntegrity(struct HpmfwupgUpgradeCtx *pFwupgCtx);
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user